Name
Papers
Collaborators
YANNAI A. GONCZAROWSKI
33
53
Citations 
PageRank 
Referers 
60
13.41
88
Referees 
References 
164
161
Search Limit
100164
Title
Citations
PageRank
Year
Market design job market candidate profiles 202200.342021
Escaping Cannibalization? Correlation-Robust Pricing for a Unit-Demand Buyer00.342020
Matching for the Israeli: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements00.342019
A Compact, Logical Approach to Large-Market Analysis.00.342019
Bulow-Klemperer-Style Results for Welfare Maximization in Two-Sided Markets.00.342019
Matching for the Israeli "Mechinot" Gap-Year Programs: Handling Rich Diversity Requirements00.342019
The Sample Complexity of Up-to-ε Multi-Dimensional Revenue Maximization00.342018
Bounding the menu-size of approximately optimal auctions via optimal-transport duality20.372018
Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One?00.342018
The Best of Both Worlds: Asymptotically Efficient Mechanisms with a Guarantee on the Expected Gains-From-Trade.00.342018
Playing on a Level Field: Sincere and Sophisticated Players in the Boston Mechanism with a Coarse Priority Structure.00.342018
Are Two (Samples) Really Better Than One? On the Non-Asymptotic Performance of Empirical Revenue Maximization.00.342018
Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof.20.662018
Submultiplicative Glivenko-Cantelli and Uniform Convergence of Revenues.20.362017
Efficient Empirical Revenue Maximization in Single-Parameter Auction Environments.140.682017
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Success Stories and Obvious Strategyproofness.40.532017
Incentives and gamification.00.342017
The Menu-Size Complexity of Revenue Approximation.80.472017
A Hydraulic Approach to Equilibria of Resource Selection Games.00.342016
Unbeatable Set Consensus via Topological and Combinatorial Reasoning.00.342016
SIGecom job market candidate profiles 202000.342016
Dating Strategies Are Not Obvious00.342015
A stable marriage requires communication60.532015
Unbeatable Consensus.00.342014
Physical Computation of Nash Equilibrium: 'Hydraulic' Resource Selection.10.402014
Noncooperative Market Allocation and the Formation of Downtown.10.362014
Timely Common Knowledge.30.392013
Manipulation of stable matchings using minimal blacklists50.612013
Sisterhood in the Gale-Shapley Matching Algorithm.50.762013
Satisfiability and Canonisation of Timely Constraints00.342013
Brief announcement: pareto optimal solutions to consensus and set consensus50.462013
Good, Better, Best! - Unbeatable Protocols for Consensus and Set Consensus.00.342013
Timely Coordination in a Multi-Agent System20.412012