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FRANÇOISE FORGES
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Name
Affiliation
Papers
FRANÇOISE FORGES
Université Paris-Dauphine, CEREMADE, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, F-75775 Paris Cedex 16, France
14
Collaborators
Citations
PageRank
15
44
7.81
Referers
Referees
References
81
71
50
Publications (14 rows)
Collaborators (15 rows)
Referers (81 rows)
Referees (71 rows)
Title
Citations
PageRank
Year
Introduction to the John Forbes Nash Jr. Memorial Special Issue.
0
0.34
2017
Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games
0
0.34
2016
Bayesian repeated games and reputation.
3
0.39
2015
Corrigendum to "Self-fulfilling mechanisms and rational expectations" [J. Econ. Theory 75 (1997) 388-406].
0
0.34
2014
A folk theorem for Bayesian games with commitment.
4
0.49
2013
Cooperative Games With Incomplete Information: Some Open Problems
6
0.55
2013
Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
3
0.60
2011
Afriat's theorem for general budget sets
7
1.35
2009
Long persuasion games
2
0.55
2008
Multistage Communication With And Without Verifiable Types
1
0.51
2008
Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium: Definition and Computational Complexity
14
1.05
2008
Feasible Mechanisms in Economies with Type-Dependent Endowments
0
0.34
2006
The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignment game
3
0.53
2004
A Note on the Incentive Compatible Core
1
0.43
2001
1