Name
Affiliation
Papers
HU FU
Cornell University
35
Collaborators
Citations 
PageRank 
63
310
23.33
Referers 
Referees 
References 
385
356
265
Search Limit
100385
Title
Citations
PageRank
Year
Asymptotically Optimal Competitive Ratio for Online Allocation of Reusable Resources00.342022
Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets.00.342022
Full surplus extraction from samples00.342021
Learning Utilities and Equilibria in Non-Truthful Auctions00.342020
Report-Sensitive Spot-Checking in Peer-Grading Systems.00.342020
Limitations Of Incentive Compatibility On Discrete Type Spaces00.342020
Simultaneous auctions without complements are (almost) efficient00.342020
Transparency and Control in Platforms for Networked Markets.00.342019
Efficient Computation of Optimal Auctions via Reduced Forms10.412019
The Vickrey Auction with a Single Duplicate Bidder Approximates the Optimal Revenue.00.342019
Allocation for Social Good: Auditing Mechanisms for Utility Maximization10.352019
Report-Sensitive Spot-checking in Peer Grading Systems00.342019
The Value of Information Concealment.00.342018
Third-Party Data Providers Ruin Simple Mechanisms00.342018
Approximately optimal auctions for correlated bidders20.412015
Randomization Beats Second Price as a Prior-Independent Auction70.552015
Optimal auctions for correlated buyers with sampling20.412014
Approximate revenue maximization in interdependent value settings100.542014
Visual Contact Angle Estimation and Traction Control for Mobile Robot in Rough-Terrain40.452014
On the complexity of computing an equilibrium in combinatorial auctions150.662014
The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions210.962013
Simultaneous auctions are (almost) efficient461.462013
Cost-recovering bayesian algorithmic mechanism design10.362013
Prior-independent auctions for risk-averse agents201.192013
Improved Lower Bounds for Testing Triangle-freeness in Boolean Functions via Fast Matrix Multiplication.40.412013
Bayesian optimal auctions via multi- to single-agent reduction352.282012
Sketching valuation functions110.612012
Ad auctions with data90.782012
Conditional equilibrium outcomes via ascending price processes with applications to combinatorial auctions with item bidding241.302012
Optimal auctions with correlated bidders are easy393.022011
Inapproximability for VCG-based combinatorial auctions301.332010
Truthfulness via Proxies70.552010
Amplified Hardness of Approximation for VCG-Based Mechanisms30.442009
Identifications of conserved 7-mers in 3'-UTRs and microRNAs in Drosophila.160.392007
Prediction of Kinase-Specific Phosphorylation Sites by One-Class SVMs20.422007