Abstract | ||
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This paper provides a formal framework for the analysis of information hiding properties of anonymous communica- tion protocols in terms of epistemic logic. The key ingre- dient is our notion of observational equivalence, which is based on the cryptographic structure of messages and re- lations between otherwise random looking messages. Two runs are considered observationally equivalent if a spy can- not discover any meaningful distinction between them. We illustrate our approach by proving sender anonymity and unlinkability for two anonymizing protocols, Onion Rout- ing and Crowds. Moreover, we consider a version of Onion Routing in which we inject a subtle error and show how our framework is capable of capturing this flaw. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2005 | 10.1145/1103576.1103585 | Computer and Communications Security |
Keywords | DocType | ISBN |
provable anonymity,crowds,knowl- edge,observational equivalence,privacy,cryptography,anonymizing protocol,cryptographic structure,key ingredient,formal methods,epistemic logic,anonymous communication protocol,onion rout- ing,meaningful distinction,anonymity,Onion Routing,formal framework,information hiding property,unlinkability | Conference | 1-59593-231-3 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
21 | 0.98 | 12 |
Authors | ||
4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
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Flavio D. Garcia | 1 | 438 | 33.08 |
Ichiro Hasuo | 2 | 260 | 26.13 |
Wolter Pieters | 3 | 226 | 28.57 |
Peter Van Rossum | 4 | 427 | 27.10 |