Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Privacy and trust affect our strategic thinking, yet have not been precisely modeled in mechanism design. In settings of incomplete information, traditional implementations of a normal-form mechanism—by disregarding the players' privacy, or assuming trust in a mediator—may fail to reach the mechanism's objectives. We thus investigate implementations of a new type. We put forward the notion of a perfect implementation of a normal-form mechanism M : in essence, a concrete extensive-form mechanism exactly preserving all strategic properties of M , without relying on trusted mediators or violating the players' privacy . We prove that any normal-form mechanism can be perfectly implemented by a verifiable mediator using envelopes and an envelope-randomizing device. Differently from a trusted mediator, a verifiable one only performs prescribed public actions, so that everyone can verify that he is acting properly, and that he never learns any information that should remain private. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1016/j.geb.2010.05.003 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Trust,Privacy,Mechanism design,C70 | Journal | 71 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.41 | 0 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sergei Izmalkov | 1 | 92 | 6.40 |
| Matt Lepinski | 2 | 149 | 8.95 |
| Silvio Micali | 3 | 11434 | 2581.31 |