Paper Info
Title
Incentive networks
Abstract
We propose a notion of incentive networks, modeling online settings in which multiple participants in a network help each other find information. Within this general setting, we study query incentive networks, a natural abstraction of question-answering systems with rewards for finding answers. We analyze strategic behavior in such networks and under a simple model of networks, show that the Nash equilibrium for participants' strategies exhibits an unexpected threshold phenomenon.
Year
DOI
Venue
2005
10.1145/1081870.1081871
LA-WEB
Keywords
DocType
ISBN
strategic behavior,online setting,Incentive Networks,question-answering system,simple model,Nash equilibrium,query incentive network,natural abstraction,general setting,incentive network,multiple participant
Conference
1-59593-135-X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.40
0
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Prabhakar Raghavan1133512776.61