Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
A reputation system should incentivize users to obtain and reveal estimates of content quality. It should also aggre- gate these estimates to establish content reputation in a way that counters strategic manipulation. Mechanisms have been proposed in recent literature that oer financial in- centives to induce these desirable outcomes. In this paper, to systematically study what we believe to be fundamental characteristics of these mechanisms, we view them as in- formation markets designed to assess content quality, and refer to them as reputation markets. Specifically, we de- velop a rational expectations equilibrium model to study how incentives created by reputation markets should influ- ence community behavior and the accuracy of assessments. Our analysis suggests that reputation markets oer a num- ber of desirable features: |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1145/1403027.1403045 | ACM SIGCOMM Conference |
Keywords | DocType | Citations |
content reputation,desirable feature,information market,content quality,counters strategic manipulation,reputation system,strategic manipulation,rational expectations equilibrium,online ratings,reputation distortion incurs,reputation market,reputation assessment,information acquisition decrease | Conference | 2 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.39 | 5 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Xiang Yan | 1 | 66 | 17.39 |
| Benjamin Van Roy | 2 | 1762 | 211.73 |