Title
Fast population game dynamics for dominant sets and other quadratic optimization problems
Abstract
We propose a fast population game dynamics, motivated by the analogy with infection and immunization processes within a population of "players," for finding dominant sets, a powerful graph-theoretical notion of a cluster. Each step of the proposed dynamics is shown to have a linear time/space complexity and we show that, under the assumption of symmetric affinities, the average population payoff is strictly increasing along any non-constant trajectory, thereby allowing us to prove that dominant sets are asymptotically stable (i.e., attractive) points for the proposed dynamics. The approach is general and can be applied to a large class of quadratic optimization problems arising in computer vision. Experimentally, the proposed dynamics is found to be orders of magnitude faster than and as accurate as standard algorithms.
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.1007/978-3-642-14980-1_26
SSPR/SPR
Keywords
Field
DocType
fast population game dynamic,average population payoff,large class,asymptotically stable,dominant set,computer vision,quadratic optimization problem,linear time,proposed dynamic,non-constant trajectory,immunization process,dominating set,space complexity,quadratic optimization
Population,Mathematical optimization,Standard algorithms,Strategy,Quadratic programming,Time complexity,Nash equilibrium,Mathematics,Stability theory,Stochastic game
Conference
Volume
ISSN
ISBN
6218
0302-9743
3-642-14979-0
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.40
12
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Samuel Rota Bulò156433.69
Immanuel M. Bomze292287.13
Marcello Pelillo31888150.33