Title
Boolean Games Revisited
Abstract
Game theory is a widely used formal model for study- ing strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games (8) are two players, zero-sum static games where players' utility functions are binary and described by a single propositional formula, and the strategies available to a player consist of truth assignments to each of a given set of propositional variables (the variables controlled by the player.) We generalize the framework to n-players games which are not necessarily zero-sum. We give simple characterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the compu- tational complexity of the related problems.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2006
European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
zero-sum static game,nash equilibrium,propositional variable,boolean game,single propositional formula,related problem,formal model,computational complexity,n-players game,game theory,nash equilibria
Field
DocType
Volume
Boolean function,Combinatorial game theory,Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Computer science,Best response,Repeated game,Normal-form game,Screening game,Propositional variable,Propositional formula
Conference
141
ISSN
ISBN
Citations 
0922-6389
1-58603-642-4
30
PageRank 
References 
Authors
1.73
10
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Elise Bonzon119315.19
Marie-christine Lagasquie-schiex265838.99
Jérôme Lang32838260.90
Bruno Zanuttini428925.43