Title
Route Distribution Incentives
Abstract
We present an incentive model for route distribution in the context of path vector routing protocols and we focus on the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP is the de-facto protocol for interdomain routing on the Internet. We model BGP route distribution and computation using a game in which a BGP speaker advertises its prefix to its direct neighbors promising them a reward for further distributing the route deeper into the network, the neighbors do the same thing with their neighbors, and so on. The result of this cascaded route distribution is an advertised prefix and hence reachability of the BGP speaker. We first study the convergence of BGP protocol dynamics to a unique outcome tree in the defined game. We then proceed to study the existence of equilibria in the full information game considering competition dynamics. We focus our work on the simplest two classes of graphs: 1) the line (and the tree) graphs which involve no competition, and 2) the ring graph which involves competition.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_39
Computing Research Repository
Keywords
DocType
Volume
unique outcome tree,bgp speaker,route distribution incentives,incentive model,advertised prefix,cascaded route distribution,full information game,competition dynamic,bgp route distribution,bgp protocol dynamic,route distribution,border gateway protocol,routing protocol,game theory
Conference
abs/0909.3
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
0
0.34
References 
Authors
10
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Joud Khoury1175.43
Chaouki T. Abdallah220934.98
Kate Krause300.34
Jorge Crichigno416814.41