Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
We present an incentive model for route distribution in the context of path
vector routing protocols and we focus on the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP). BGP
is the de-facto protocol for interdomain routing on the Internet. We model BGP
route distribution and computation using a game in which a BGP speaker
advertises its prefix to its direct neighbors promising them a reward for
further distributing the route deeper into the network, the neighbors do the
same thing with their neighbors, and so on. The result of this cascaded route
distribution is an advertised prefix and hence reachability of the BGP speaker.
We first study the convergence of BGP protocol dynamics to a unique outcome
tree in the defined game. We then proceed to study the existence of equilibria
in the full information game considering competition dynamics. We focus our
work on the simplest two classes of graphs: 1) the line (and the tree) graphs
which involve no competition, and 2) the ring graph which involves competition. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1007/978-3-642-10841-9_39 | Computing Research Repository |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
unique outcome tree,bgp speaker,route distribution incentives,incentive model,advertised prefix,cascaded route distribution,full information game,competition dynamic,bgp route distribution,bgp protocol dynamic,route distribution,border gateway protocol,routing protocol,game theory | Conference | abs/0909.3 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0302-9743 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
10 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Joud Khoury | 1 | 17 | 5.43 |
Chaouki T. Abdallah | 2 | 209 | 34.98 |
Kate Krause | 3 | 0 | 0.34 |
Jorge Crichigno | 4 | 168 | 14.41 |