Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Informally, a public-key steganography protocol allows two parties, who have never met or exchanged a secret, to send hidden mes- sages over a public channel so that an adversary cannot even detect that these hidden messages are being sent. Unlike previous settings in which provable security has been applied to steganography, public-key steganography is information-theoretically impossible. In this work we introduce computational security conditions for public-key steganogra- phy similar to those introduced by Hopper, Langford and von Ahn (7) for the private-key setting. We also give the rst protocols for public- key steganography and steganographic key exchange that are provably secure under standard cryptographic assumptions. Additionally, in the random oracle model, we present a protocol that is secure against adver- saries that have access to a decoding oracle (a steganographic analogue of Racko and Simon's attacker-specic adaptive chosen-ciphertext ad- versaries from CRYPTO 91 (10)). |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2003 | 10.1007/978-3-540-24676-3_20 | IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
public-key cryptography,provable security,steganography,key exchange,public key cryptography,public key,random oracle model,computer security | Steganography,Steganography tools,Key exchange,Cryptography,Computer science,Computer security,Random oracle,Oracle,Theoretical computer science,Public-key cryptography,Provable security | Journal |
Volume | Citations | PageRank |
2003 | 26 | 1.18 |
References | Authors | |
17 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Luis von Ahn | 1 | 3461 | 346.66 |
| Nicholas Hopper | 2 | 1469 | 95.76 |