Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This is, arguably, the simplest setting that models selection among certain and uncertain outcomes in a multi-agent system. We study the properties of equilibria in such games from both a game-theoretic perspective and a computational perspective. Our main positive result establishes the existence of a semi-strong equilibrium in every such game. We show that although simple, pay of play games contain a large variety of well-studied environments, e.g., vaccination games. We discuss the interesting implications of our results for these environments. |
Year | Venue | DocType |
|---|---|---|
2013 | UAI | Journal |
Volume | Citations | PageRank |
abs/1309.6854 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
9 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sigal Oren | 1 | 118 | 15.86 |
| Michael Schapira | 2 | 13 | 2.73 |
| Moshe Tennenholtz | 3 | 3650 | 437.92 |