Title
Visualizing combinatorial auctions
Abstract
We propose a novel scheme to visualize combinatorial auctions; auctions that involve the simultaneous sale of multiple items. Buyers bid on complementary sets of items, or bundles, where the utility of securing all the items in the bundle is more than the sum of the utility of the individual items. Our visualizations use concentric rings divided into arcs to visualize the bundles in an auction. The arcs’ positions and overlaps allow viewers to identify and follow bidding strategies. Properties of color, texture, and motion are used to represent different attributes of the auction, including active bundles, prices bid for each bundle, winning bids, and bidders’ interests. Keyframe animations are used to show changes in an auction over time. We demonstrate our visualization technique on a standard testbed dataset generated by researchers to evaluate combinatorial auction bid strategies, and on recent Federal Communications Commission (FCC) auctions designed to allocate wireless spectrum licenses to cell phone service providers.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1007/s00371-011-0576-9
The Visual Computer
Keywords
Field
DocType
bidding strategy,combinatorial auction bid strategy,prices bid,buyers bid,cell phone service provider,complementary set,keyframe animation,active bundle,combinatorial auction,combinatorial auction · ecommerce · perception · visualization,different attribute,ecommerce,service provider,perception,visualization,spectrum
Mathematical optimization,Information retrieval,Unique bid auction,Computer science,Combinatorial auction,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Auction theory,Common value auction,Bidding,Forward auction,Auction algorithm
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
27
6-8
1432-2315
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.35
7
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Joe Ping-Lin Hsiao110.35
Christopher G. Healey286165.46