Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper deals with 2-player coordination games with vanishing actions, which are repeated games where all diagonal payoffs are strictly positive and all non-diagonal payoffs are zero with the following additional property: At any stage beyond r, if a player has not played a certain action for the last r stages, then he unlearns this action and it disappears from his action set. Such a game is called an r-restricted game. To evaluate the stream of payoffs we use the average reward. For r = 1 the game strategically reduces to a one-shot game and for r ≥ 3 in Schoenmakers (Int Game Theory Rev 4:119–126, 2002) it is shown that all payoffs in the convex hull of the diagonal payoffs are equilibrium rewards. In this paper for the case r = 2 we provide a characterization of the set of equilibrium rewards for 2 × 2 games of this type and a technique to find the equilibrium rewards in m × m games. We also discuss subgame perfection. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1007/s00182-010-0268-0 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
subgame perfect equilibrium,repeated game,coordination game,game theory,convex hull,coordination games,nash equilibrium,repeated games | Welfare economics,Combinatorial game theory,Mathematical economics,Repeated game,Symmetric game,Normal-form game,Sequential game,Example of a game without a value,Mathematics,Stochastic game,Extensive-form game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
40 | 4 | 1432-1270 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 1 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| János Flesch | 1 | 108 | 26.87 |
| Gijs Schoenmakers | 2 | 41 | 7.21 |
| O. J. Vrieze | 3 | 49 | 19.22 |