Title
Breaking The Winner'S Curse In Outsourcing
Abstract
This research utilizes real options theory to investigate how to break the winner's curse in contracting through effective contracting mechanisms. We focus on two contracting approaches: flexible price contract and gain-sharing contract. For reasons of analytical tractability, we first utilize the geometric Brownian motion as the dynamic model to obtain closed-form solutions to break the outsourcing winner's curse. Subsequently, we extend our model to the mean-reverting process and provide numerical examples to verify the validity of our closed-form results, which have not previously been presented in the outsourcing literature. Finally, we provide prescriptions for the problem of the winner's curse in outsourcing.
Year
DOI
Venue
2010
10.1111/j.1540-5915.2010.00281.x
DECISION SCIENCES
Keywords
Field
DocType
Flexible Price Contract, Gain-Sharing Contract, Geometric Brownian Motion, Mean-Reverting Process, Outsourcing, Winner's Curse
Mathematical economics,Economics,Curse,Outsourcing,Geometric Brownian motion,Winner's curse,Operations management
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
41
3
0011-7315
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.36
2
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Bin Jiang1232.70
Srinivas Talluri240037.91
Tao Yao3938.93
Yongma Moon4292.78