Paper Info
Title
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of TCP Vegas
Abstract
We use the tools from game theory to understand the impacts-of the inherent congestion pricing schemes in TCP Vegas as well, as the problems of parameter setting of TCP Vegas on its performance. It is shown how these inherent pricing schemes result in a rate control equilibrium state that is a Nash equilibrium which is also a global optimum of the all-Vegas networks. On the other hand, if the TCP Vegas' users are assumed to be selfish in terms of setting their desired number of backlogged packets in the buffers along their paths, then the network as a whole, in certain circumstances, would operate very inefficiently. This poses a serious threat to the possible deployment of Vegas-based TCP (such as FAST TCP) in the future Internet.
Year
DOI
Venue
2004
10.1007/978-3-540-30193-6_34
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Keywords
Field
DocType
congestion pricing,tcp vegas,nash equilibrium,game theory,equilibrium state
Computer science,Computer security,TCP Vegas,Computer network,Transmission Control Protocol,Zeta-TCP,TCP tuning,Nash equilibrium,TCP global synchronization,TCP Friendly Rate Control,HSTCP,Distributed computing
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
3266
0302-9743
3
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.45
11
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Tuan Anh Trinh19710.82
Sándor Molnár230638.56