Title
Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
Abstract
.   We consider the problem of allocating an infinitely divisible endowment among a group of agents with single-dipped preferences. A probabilistic allocation rule assigns a probability distribution over the set of possible allocations to every preference profile. We discuss characterizations of the classes of Pareto-optimal and strategy-proof probabilistic rules which satisfy in addition replacement-domination or no-envy. Interestingly, these results also apply to problems of allocating finitely many identical indivisible objects – to probabilistic and to deterministic allocation.
Year
DOI
Venue
2002
10.1007/s003550100114
Social Choice and Welfare
Keywords
Field
DocType
probability distribution,infinite divisibility,satisfiability
Mathematical optimization,Mathematical economics,Endowment,Probability distribution,Probabilistic logic,Infinite divisibility,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
19
2
1432-217X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
3
0.95
3
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Lars Ehlers17810.01