Title
A Ciphertext-Only Attack Against the Cai-Cusick Lattice-Based Public-Key Cryptosystem
Abstract
In 1998, Cai and Cusick proposed a lattice-based public-key cryptosystem based on the similar ideas of the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem, but with much less data expansion. However, they didn't give any security proof. In our paper, we present an efficient ciphertext-only attack which runs in polynomial time against the cryptosystem to recover the message, so the Cai-Cusick lattice-based public-key cryptosystem is not secure.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1109/TIT.2010.2103790
IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
Keywords
Field
DocType
efficient ciphertext-only attack,similar idea,security proof,data expansion,cai-cusick lattice-based public-key cryptosystem,polynomial time,ajtai-dwork cryptosystem,public-key cryptosystem,ciphertext-only attack,lattice-based public-key cryptosystem,gram schmidt orthogonalization,resists,ciphertext only attack,lattices,public key cryptography,lattice
Hybrid cryptosystem,Discrete mathematics,Cramer–Shoup cryptosystem,NTRUEncrypt,Computer science,Goldwasser–Micali cryptosystem,Benaloh cryptosystem,Plaintext-aware encryption,Theoretical computer science,Cryptosystem,Threshold cryptosystem
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
57
3
0018-9448
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
4
0.43
8
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Yanbin Pan13513.29
Yingpu Deng2388.06