Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper, we introduce a framework for providing incentives for honest participation in global-scale distributed trust management infrastructures. Our system can improve the quality of information supplied by these systems by reducing free-riding and encouraging honesty. Our approach is twofold: (1) we provide rewards for participants that advertise their experiences to others, and (2) impose the credible threat of halting the rewards, for a substantial amount of time, for participants who consistently provide suspicious feedback. For this purpose we develop an honesty metric which can indicate the accuracy of feedback. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2004 | 10.1007/978-3-540-24747-0_6 | Lecture Notes in Computer Science |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
quality of information,free riding | Information system,Incentive,Computer science,Honesty,Knowledge management,Non-credible threat,Information quality | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
2995 | 0302-9743 | 34 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
1.78 | 10 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Alberto Fernandes | 1 | 34 | 1.78 |
| Evangelos Kotsovinos | 2 | 361 | 22.80 |
| Sven Östring | 3 | 162 | 11.98 |
| Boris Dragovic | 4 | 3254 | 302.12 |