Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In this paper we present a real-world hardware-assisted attack on the well-known A5/1 stream cipher which is (still) used to secure GSM communication in most countries all over the world. During the last ten years A5/1 has been intensively analyzed [1,2,3,4,5,6,7]. However, most of the proposed attacks are just of theoretical interest since they lack from practicability -- due to strong preconditions, high computational demands and/or huge storage requirements -- or have never been fully implemented.In contrast to these attacks, our attack which is based on the work by Keller and Seitz [8] is running on an existing special-purpose hardware device, called COPACOBANA [9]. With the knowledge of only 64 bits of keystream the machine is able to reveal the corresponding internal 64-bit state of the cipher in about 6 hours on average. We provide a detailed description of our attack architecture as well as implementation results. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1007/978-3-540-85053-3_17 | IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
. a5/1,real-world hardware-assisted attack,proposed attack,special-purpose hardware,gsm,attack architecture,existing special-purpose hardware device,years a5,stream cipher,64-bit state,well-known a5,detailed description,real-world attack,copacobana.,gsm communication,a5 1 | Conference | 2008 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0302-9743 | 17 | 1.05 |
References | Authors | |
12 | 3 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timo Gendrullis | 1 | 57 | 3.53 |
| Martin Novotný | 2 | 59 | 12.18 |
| Andy Rupp | 3 | 196 | 16.95 |