Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We examine voting location problems in which the goal is to place, based on an election amongst the users, a given number of facilities in a graph. The user preference is modeled by shortest path distances in the graph. A Condorcet solution is a set of facilities to which there does not exist an alternative set preferred by a majority of the users. Recent works generalize the model to additive indifference and replaced user majority by γ-proportion. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.06.039 | European Journal of Operational Research |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Group decisions and negotiations,Facility location,Condorcet,Simpson score,Efficient graph algorithms | Mathematical optimization,Tree (graph theory),Anti-plurality voting,Voting,Facility location problem,Cardinal voting systems,Ranked pairs,Optimization problem,Mathematics,Condorcet method | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
181 | 2 | 0377-2217 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
18 | 1.08 | 5 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hartmut Noltemeier | 1 | 398 | 97.45 |
| Joachim Spoerhase | 2 | 112 | 14.12 |
| Hans-christoph Wirth | 3 | 146 | 15.90 |