Paper Info
Title
A new family of authentication protocols
Abstract
We present a related family of authentication and digital signature protocols based on symmetric cryptographic primitives which perform substantially better than previous constructions. Previously, one-time digital signatures based on hash functions involved hundreds of hash function computations for each signature; we show that given online access to a timestamping service, we can sign messages using only two computations of a hash function. Previously, techniques to sign infinite streams involved one such one-time signature for each message block; we show that in many realistic scenarios a small number of hash function computations is sufficient. Previously, the Diffie Hellman protocol enabled two principals to create a confidentiality key from scratch: we provide an equivalent protocol for integrity, which enables two people who do not share a secret to set up a securely serialised channel into which attackers cannot subsequently intrude. In addition to being of potential use in real applications, our constructions also raise interesting questions about the definition of a digital signature, and the relationship between integrity and authenticity.
Year
DOI
Venue
1998
10.1145/302350.302353
Operating Systems Review
Keywords
Field
DocType
diffie hellman,non repudiation,hash function,hashing,authentication,authentication protocol,digital signature
Hash-based message authentication code,SHA-2,Message authentication code,Computer science,Merkle signature scheme,Computer security,Cryptographic hash function,Digital signature,Theoretical computer science,Hash function,Hash chain,Distributed computing
Journal
Volume
Issue
Citations 
32
4
77
PageRank 
References 
Authors
10.37
20
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ross J. Anderson15349971.91
Francesco Bergadano2800182.24
Bruno Crispo31829237.11
Jong-Hyeon Lee48412.27
Charalampos Manifavas532243.40
Roger M. Needham646482075.99