Title
Pricing and advertisement in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain.
Abstract
We use a game theoretical approach to study pricing and advertisement decisions in a manufacturer–retailer supply chain when price discounts are offered by both the manufacturer and retailer. When the manufacturer is the leader of the game, we obtained Stackelberg equilibrium with manufacturer’s local allowance, national brand name investment, manufacturer’s preferred price discount, retailer’s price discount, and local advertising expense. For the special case of two-stage equilibrium when the manufacturer’s price discount is exogenous, we found that the retailer is willing to increase local advertising expense if the manufacturer increases local advertising allowance and provides deeper price discount, or if the manufacturer decreases its brand name investment. When both the manufacturer and retailer have power, Nash equilibrium in a competition game is obtained. The comparison between the Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium shows that the manufacturer always prefers Stackelberg equilibrium, but there is no definitive conclusion for the retailer. The bargaining power can be used to determine the profit sharing between the manufacturer and the retailer. Once the profit sharing is determined, we suggest a simple contract to help the manufacturer and retailer obtain their desired profit sharing.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1016/j.ejor.2013.06.007
European Journal of Operational Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
Supply chain,Advertising,Price discount,Game theory,Contract
Profit sharing,Advertising,Bargaining power,Microeconomics,Game theory,Supply chain,Nash equilibrium,Stackelberg competition,Mathematics,National brand,Special case
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
231
2
0377-2217
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
14
0.64
5
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jinfeng Yue114311.37
Jill Austin2844.82
Zhimin Huang3181.80
Bintong Chen441741.71