Paper Info
Title
Secure Generalized Vickrey Auction without Third-party Servers
Abstract
This paper presents a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme that does not require third-party servers, i.e., the scheme is executed only by an auctioneer and bidders. Combinatorial auctions, in which multiple goods are sold simultaneously, have recently attracted considerable attention. The GVA can handle combinatorial auctions and has good theoretical characteristics such as incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency. Secure GVA schemes have been developed to prevent frauds by an auctioneer. However, existing methods require third-party servers to execute the protocol. Having third-party servers that are operated by independent organizations is difficult in practice. Therefore, it is desirable that a protocol be executed by the participants themselves. However, if bidders take part in the execution of the auction procedure, a bidder might have an incentive to be an active adversary so that he manipulates the declarations of other bidders to become a winner or to decrease his payment. In our proposed scheme, we use a new protocol that can achieve the same outcome as the GVA. In this protocol, the procedure executed by a bidder affects neither the prices nor the allocation of the bidder. Therefore, a bidder does not have an incentive to be an active adversary.
Year
DOI
Venue
2004
10.1007/978-3-540-27809-2_17
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Keywords
Field
DocType
Generalized Vickrey Auction,combinatorial auction,mechanism design,game-theory
English auction,Vickrey auction,Incentive compatibility,Computer science,Computer security,Combinatorial auction,Server,Generalized second-price auction,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Common value auction
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
3110
0302-9743
11
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.74
25
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Makoto Yokoo13632421.99
Koutarou Suzuki251829.57