Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Auctions that select core allocations with respect to reported values generate competitive levels of sales revenues at equilibrium
and limit bidder incentives to use shills. Among core-selecting auctions, the ones that minimize seller revenues also maximize
incentives for truthful reporting, produce the Vickrey outcome when that lies in the core and, in contrast to the Vickrey
auction, and create no incentive for a seller to exclude qualified bidders. Core-selecting auctions are related to and share
properties with stable matching mechanisms. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1007/s00182-007-0100-7 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
core · stable matching · marriage problem · auctions · core-selecting auctions · menu auctions · proxy auctions · package bidding · combinatorial bidding · incentives · truncation strategies,incentives,vickrey auction,auctions,stable matching,core | Journal | 36 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
3 | 1432-1270 | 66 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
3.90 | 3 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Robert Day | 1 | 193 | 15.90 |
| Paul Milgrom | 2 | 68 | 5.19 |