Title
Cooperation in Multiorganization Matching
Abstract
We study a problem involving a set of organizations. Each organization has its own pool of clients who either supply or demand one unit of an indivisible product. Knowing the profit induced by each buyer- seller pair, an organization's task is to conduct such transactions within its database of clients in order to maximize the amount of the trans- actions. Inter-organizations transactions are allowed: in this situation, two clients from distinct organizations can trade and their organizations share the induced profit. Since maximizing the overall profit leads to un- acceptable situations where an organization can be penalized, we study the problem of maximizing the overall profit such that no organization gets less than it can obtain on its own. Complexity results, an approxi- mation algorithm and a matching inapproximation bound are given.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_7
Algorithmic Operations Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
distinct organization,multiorganization matching,overall profit,complexity,inter-organizations transaction,approximation algorithm,buyer-seller pair,indivisible product,complexity result,assignment problem,cooperation,matching inapproximation,induced profit,approxi- mation,own pool,profitability,approximation
Approximation algorithm,Mathematical optimization,Video game design,Computer science,Bipartite graph,Nash equilibrium
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
7
2
0302-9743
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.40
9
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Laurent Gourvès124130.97
Jérôme Monnot251255.74
Fanny Pascual39714.48