Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
. Beyond determining whether procedures can be manipulated, the real goal for any analysis of “strategic behavior” is to identify
all settings where and when this can be done, who can do it, and what they should do. By applying the geometric approach of
Saari [7, 8] to the Kemeny's Rule (KR), we demonstrate how surprisingly simple this analysis can be, we identify all three
candidate KR strategic behavior, and we show how an almost identical analysis answers most other multiple profile concerns
(e.g., the abstention paradox and when voters just make errors). We also introduce new measures, which can be used with any
procedure, to compare strategic and other behavior involving “changes.” These measures help to identify settings where it
may be more important to worry about honest mistakes than strategic voting. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2000 | 10.1007/s003550000050 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Geometric Approach,Strategic Behavior,Real Goal,Strategic Vote,Identical Analysis | Welfare economics,Economics,Voting,Strategic behavior,Worry | Journal |
Volume | Issue | Citations |
17 | 4 | 2 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.64 | 0 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| DONALD G. SAARI | 1 | 99 | 29.14 |
| Vincent R. Merlin | 2 | 27 | 7.54 |