Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Real world players often increase their payoffs by voluntarily committing to play a fixed strategy, prior to the start of a strategic game. In fact, the players may further benefit from commitments that are conditional on the commitments of others. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1016/j.geb.2009.09.008 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
C70 | Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Economics,Microeconomics,Folk theorem,Non-cooperative game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
69 | 1 | 0899-8256 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
16 | 1.91 | 5 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Adam Tauman Kalai | 1 | 1620 | 115.10 |
| Ehud Kalai | 2 | 135 | 44.65 |
| Ehud Lehrer | 3 | 186 | 35.29 |
| Dov Samet | 4 | 164 | 36.69 |