Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
To come to a deal, a bargaining process can sometimes take a long time. An auction may be a faster, but existing auction models cannot cope with situations where money is not an issue, or where it is dicult to express the utility of all participants in a monetary domain. We propose a modified Vickrey auction based only on preferences over the possible bids. This approach also allows for situations where a bid is not just a price or some fixed set of attributes, but can be any possible oer. We prove that in this flexible, generalized setting, the Vickrey mechanism is still incentive compatible and results in a Pareto-ecient solution. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1007/978-3-540-74481-8_5 | Holonic and Multi-Agent Systems for Manufacturing |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
vickrey mechanism,pareto-efficient solution,modified vickrey auction,fixed set,bargaining process,long time,possible bid,existing auction model,possible offer,arbitrary deals,generalized setting,vickrey auction,incentive compatibility | English auction,Vickrey auction,Mathematical economics,Computer science,Combinatorial auction,Generalized second-price auction,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Auction theory,Proxy bid,Revenue equivalence | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
4659 | 0302-9743 | 2 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.58 | 8 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tamás Máhr | 1 | 128 | 7.69 |
| Mathijs Weerdt | 2 | 411 | 41.00 |