Title
Model Checking Strategic Equilibria
Abstract
Solution concepts are a fundamental tool for the analysis of game-like systems, and as a consequence, much effort has been devoted to the problem of characterising solution concepts using logic. However, one problem is that, to characterise solution concepts such as Nash equilibrium, i t seems necessary to refer to strategies in the object language, which tends to co mplicate the object language. We propose a logic in which we can formulate important properties of games (and in particular pure-strategy solution concept s) without recourse to naming strategies in the object language. The idea is that in stead of using pred- icates which state that a particular collection of strategi es forms a solution, we define formulae of the logic that are true at a state if and only if this state con- stitutes a particular equilibrium outcome. We demonstrate the usefulness of the logic by model checking equilibria of strategic games.
Year
DOI
Venue
2008
10.1007/978-3-642-00431-5_11
Model Checking and Artificial Intelligence
Keywords
Field
DocType
model checking strategic equilibria,model checking equilibrium,nash equilibrium,solution concept,game-like system,object language,particular pure-strategy solution concept,characterising solution concept,fundamental tool,particular equilibrium outcome,particular collection,model checking
Epistemic modal logic,Model checking,Theoretical computer science,Object language,Equilibrium selection,If and only if,Predicate (grammar),Solution concept,Nash equilibrium,Mathematics
Conference
Volume
ISSN
Citations 
5348
0302-9743
4
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.46
16
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Nicolas Troquard126629.54
Wiebe Van Der Hoek22566195.77
Michael Wooldridge310010810.27