Title
Les crashs sont rationnels
Abstract
As we show by using notions of equilibrium in infinite sequential games, crashes or financial escalations are rational for economic or environmental agents, who have a vision of an infinite world. This contradicts a picture of a self-regulating, wise and pacific economic world. In other words, in this context, equilibrium is not synonymous of stability. We try to draw, from this statement, methodological consequences and new ways of thinking, especially in economic game theory. Among those new paths, coinduction is the basis of our reasoning in infinite games.
Year
Venue
Field
2011
CoRR
Computer science,Humanities,Artificial intelligence,Distributed computing
DocType
Volume
Citations 
Journal
abs/1111.7299
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Pierre Lescanne1925123.70