Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation types: that of players who imitate choice of other (optimizing) types. Game theorists typically study the evolution of such games in dynamical systems with imitation rules. In the setting of games of infinite duration on finite graphs with preference orderings on outcomes for player types, we explore the possibility of imitation as a viable strategy. In our setup, the optimising players play bounded memory strategies and the imitators play according to specifications given by automata. We present algorithmic results on the eventual survival of types. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.4204/EPTCS.25.16 | ELECTRONIC PROCEEDINGS IN THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
game theory,dynamic system | Combinatorial game theory,Mathematical economics,Game mechanics,Video game design,Repeated game,Artificial intelligence,Screening game,Sequential game,Non-cooperative game,Mathematics,Stochastic game | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
abs/1006.2 | 25 | 2075-2180 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.46 | 5 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Soumya Paul | 1 | 29 | 5.87 |
| Ramaswamy Ramanujam | 2 | 238 | 22.85 |