Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Applications that process sensitive data can be carefully designed and validated to be difficult to attack, but they are usually run on monolithic, commodity operating systems, which may be less secure. An OS compromise gives the attacker complete access to all of an application's data, regardless of how well the application is built. We propose a new system, Virtual Ghost, that protects applications from a compromised or even hostile OS. Virtual Ghost is the first system to do so by combining compiler instrumentation and run-time checks on operating system code, which it uses to create ghost memory that the operating system cannot read or write. Virtual Ghost interposes a thin hardware abstraction layer between the kernel and the hardware that provides a set of operations that the kernel must use to manipulate hardware, and provides a few trusted services for secure applications such as ghost memory management, encryption and signing services, and key management. Unlike previous solutions, Virtual Ghost does not use a higher privilege level than the kernel. Virtual Ghost performs well compared to previous approaches; it outperforms InkTag on five out of seven of the LMBench microbenchmarks with improvements between 1.3x and 14.3x. For network downloads, Virtual Ghost experiences a 45% reduction in bandwidth at most for small files and nearly no reduction in bandwidth for large files and web traffic. An application we modified to use ghost memory shows a maximum additional overhead of 5% due to the Virtual Ghost protections. We also demonstrate Virtual Ghost's efficacy by showing how it defeats sophisticated rootkit attacks. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1145/2541940.2541986 | ASPLOS |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
thin hardware abstraction layer,commodity operating system,virtual ghost,ghost memory management,operating system,secure application,system code,virtual ghost protection,hostile operating system,new system,ghost memory,software security | Key management,Web traffic,Privilege level,Software security assurance,Computer science,Rootkit,Parallel computing,Encryption,Compiler,Memory management,Operating system,Embedded system | Conference |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
42 | 1 | 0163-5964 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
49 | 1.63 | 16 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| John Criswell | 1 | 412 | 19.95 |
| Nathan Dautenhahn | 2 | 129 | 5.72 |
| Vikram S. Adve | 3 | 3347 | 183.25 |