Paper Info
Title
What Truth Depends on
Abstract
What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence f is said to depend on a set F of sentences iff the truth value of f supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of F in/from the extension of the truth predicate. Both f and the members of F are allowed to contain the truth predicate. On that basis we are able define notions such as ungroundedness or self-referentiality within a classical semantics, and we can show that there is an adequate definition of truth for the class of sentences which depend on non-semantic states of affairs.
Year
DOI
Venue
2005
10.1007/s10992-004-3758-3
J. Philosophical Logic
Keywords
Field
DocType
ungroundedness,truth,dependence,self-referentiality,supervenience
Logical connective,Coherence theory of truth,Truth value,Algorithm,Truth predicate,Semantic theory of truth,Sentence,Truth function,Mathematics,Philosophical logic
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
34
2
1573-0433
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
23
2.85
6
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hannes Leitgeb111519.26