Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Substantial facts (or states of affairs) are not well-understood entities. Many philosophers object to their existence on this basis. Yet facts, if they can be understood,
promise to do a lot of philosophical work: they can be used to construct theories of property possession and truthmaking,
for example. Here, I give a formal theory of facts, including negative and logically complex facts. I provide a theory of
reduction similar to that of the typed λ-calculus and use it to provide identity conditions for facts. This theory validates truthmaker maximalism: it provides truthmakers for all truths. I then show how the usual truth-in-a-model relation can be replaced by two relations:
one between models and facts, saying that a given fact obtains relative to the model, and the other between facts and propositions:
the truthmaking relation. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1007/s10992-010-9141-7 | J. Philosophical Logic |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
facts · states of affairs · ontology · negative facts · properties · truthmaking · λ-calculus · reduction | Journal | 40 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 1573-0433 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 3 | 1 |