Title
The Social Climbing Game
Abstract
The structure of societies depends, to some extent, on the incentives of the individuals they are composed of. We study a stylized model of this interplay, that suggests that the more individuals aim at climbing the social hierarchy, the more society’s hierarchy gets strong. Such a dependence is sharp, in the sense that a persistent hierarchical order emerges abruptly when the preference for social status gets larger than a threshold. This phase transition has its origin in the fact that the presence of a well defined hierarchy allows agents to climb it, thus reinforcing it, whereas in a “disordered” society it is harder for agents to find out whom they should connect to in order to become more central. Interestingly, a social order emerges when agents strive harder to climb society and it results in a state of reduced social mobility, as a consequence of ergodicity breaking, where climbing is more difficult.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1007/s10955-013-0693-0
Journal of Statistical Physics
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Social networks,Phase transitions,Game theory
Journal
abs/1207.6416
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
3
Journal of Statistical Physics 151 (2013), pp. 440-457
2
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.52
0
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Marco Bardoscia120.86
Giancarlo De Luca220.52
Giacomo Livan393.78
Matteo Marsili414917.65
Claudio J. Tessone511615.73