Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
According to Network Effect literature network ex- ternalities lead to market failure due to Pareto-inferior coordina- tion results. We show that the assumptions and simplifications implicitly used for modeling standardization processes fail to explain the real-world variety of diffusion courses in today's dynamic IT markets and derive requirements for a more gen- eral model of network effects. We argue that Agent-based Com- putational Economics provides a solid basis for meeting these requirements by integrating evolutionary models from Game Theory and Institutional Economics. |
Year | Venue | Keywords |
|---|---|---|
2000 | ECIS | game theory,network effect,market failure,institutional economics |
Field | DocType | Citations |
Network formation,Rational agent,Market failure,Computer science,Microeconomics,Network effect,Game theory,Computational economics,Institutional economics,Positive political theory | Conference | 22 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
2.61 | 2 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tim Weitzel | 1 | 65 | 9.41 |
| Oliver Wendt | 2 | 127 | 20.98 |
| Falk Von Westarp | 3 | 47 | 9.16 |