Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The egalitarian solution for TU-games as introduced by Dutta and Ray [Dutta, B., Ray, D., 1989. A concept of egalitarianism under participation constraints, Econometrica 57, 615–635] is studied. Five characterizations of the restriction of this solution to the class of convex games are given. They all involve a stability property due to the concept of the equal division core from Selten [Selten, R., 1972. Equal share analysis of characteristic function experiments. In: Sauermann, H. (Ed.), Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, Vol. 3, J.C.B. Mohr, Tübingen, pp. 130–165] and all but the third characterization involve a property restricting maximum payoffs. The first two characterizations use in addition efficiency and the reduced game properties of Hart and Mas-Colell [Hart, S., Mas-Colell, A., 1989. Potential, value and consistency. Econometrica 57, 589–614] and Davis and Maschler [Davis, M., Maschler, M., 1965. The kernel of a cooperative game. Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 12, 223–259], respectively. The fourth and fifth characterization only need in addition weak variants of the reduced game properties mentioned above. The third characterization involves besides the stability condition, efficiency and a new consistency property. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2000 | 10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00038-4 | Mathematical Social Sciences |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Egalitarian solution,Convex games,Characterizations | Journal | 40 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0165-4896 | 4 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.50 | 0 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Flip Klijn | 1 | 233 | 35.55 |
| Marco Slikker | 2 | 191 | 46.31 |
| Stef Tijs | 3 | 546 | 111.01 |
| José M. Zarzuelo | 4 | 98 | 22.79 |