Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We use the simple dynamic model developed in Sarin and Vahid (1999, Games and Economic Behavior, 28, 294–309) to explain the experiments reported in Erev and Roth (1998, American Economic Review, 88, 848–881). In an earlier paper (Sarin and Vahid (1998, mimeo, Texas A&M University and Monash University)) we showed that the model predicted behavior in repeated coordination games remarkably well, and better than equilibrium theory or reinforcement learning models. In this paper we show that the same one-parameter model can also explain behavior in games with a unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium better than alternative models. Hence, we obtain further support for the simple dynamic model. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, D8. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2001 | 10.1006/game.1999.0783 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
reinforcement learning,nash equilibrium,coordination game,game theory,equilibrium theory,probability,mixed strategy | Journal | 34 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0899-8256 | 19 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
7.38 | 0 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rajiv Sarin | 1 | 30 | 12.36 |
| Farshid Vahid | 2 | 19 | 7.38 |