Abstract | ||
---|---|---|
Digital copies are susceptible to theft and vulnerable to leakage, copying, or manipulation. When someone (or some group),
who has stolen, leaked, copied, or manipulated digital documents propagates the documents over the Internet and/or distributes
those through physical distribution channels many challenges arise which document holders must overcome in order to mitigate
the impact to their privacy or business. This paper focuses on the propagation problem of digital credentials, which may contain
sensitive information about a credential holder. Existing work such as access control policies and the Platform for Privacy
Preferences (P3P) assumes that qualified or certified credential viewers are honest and reliable. The proposed approach in
this paper uses short-lived credentials based on reverse forward secure signatures to remove this assumption and mitigate
the damage caused by a dishonest or honest but compromised viewer.
|
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1007/978-3-540-77048-0_9 | International Conference on Information and Communication Security |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
certified credential viewer,digital credential,unofficial information propagation,short-lived credential,existing work,digital document,document holder,privacy preferences,credential holder,access control policy,digital copy,forward security | Internet privacy,Computer science,Computer security,Copying,Computer network,Communication channel,Access control,Information sensitivity,Certification,Credential,Digital credential,The Internet | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | ISBN |
4681 | 0302-9743 | 3-540-77047-X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
5 | 0.57 | 21 |
Authors | ||
5 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Zhengyi Le | 1 | 228 | 19.09 |
Yi Ouyang | 2 | 157 | 12.00 |
Yurong Xu | 3 | 158 | 13.68 |
James Ford | 4 | 227 | 16.26 |
Fillia Makedon | 5 | 1676 | 201.73 |