Paper Info
Title
Spectrum sharing games on the interference channel.
Abstract
In this paper, we address the problem of spectrum sharing where competitive operators coexist in the same frequency band. First, we model this problem as a strategic non-cooperative game where operators simultaneously share the spectrum according to the Nash Equilibrium (N.E). Given a set of channel realizations, several Nash equilibria exist which renders the outcome of the game unpredictable. For this reason, the spectrum sharing problem is reformulated as a Stackelberg game where the first operator is already being deployed and the secondary operator follows next. The Stackelberg equilibrium (S.E) is reached where the best response of the secondary operator is taken into account upon maximizing the primary operator's utility function. Finally, we assess the goodness of the proposed distributed approach by comparing its performance to the centralized approach.
Year
DOI
Venue
2009
10.1109/GAMENETS.2009.5137440
GAMENETS
Keywords
Field
DocType
spectrum sharing problem,strategic non-cooperative game,centralized approach,interference channel,stackelberg equilibrium,stackelberg game,spectrum sharing,competitive operators coexist,primary operator,nash equilibrium,secondary operator,interference,data mining,resource management,frequency,nist,transmitters,base stations,wireless networks,game theory,spectrum,cognitive radio,wireless network,decision theory,nash equilibria,channel allocation,non cooperative game,lead,games
Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Economics,Best response,Repeated game,Equilibrium selection,Game theory,Operator (computer programming),Stackelberg competition,Nash equilibrium,Cognitive radio
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
5
0.61
21
Authors
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Mehdi Bennis13652217.26
Mael Le Treust2101.09
Samson Lasaulce386874.24
Merouane Debbah465034.40
Jorma Lilleberg530928.29