Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Recent results have used game theory to explore the nature of optimal investments in the security of simple series and parallel systems. However, it is clearly important in practice to extend these simple security models to more complicated system structures with both parallel and series subsystems (and, eventually, to more general networked systems). The purpose of this paper is to begin to address this challenge. While achieving fully general results is likely to be difficult, and may require heuristic approaches, we are able to find closed-form results for systems with moderately general structures, under the assumption that the cost of an attack against any given component increases linearly in the amount of defensive investment in that component. These results have interesting and sometimes counterintuitive implications for the nature of optimal investments in security. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2007 | 10.1016/j.ejor.2006.03.057 | European Journal of Operational Research |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Game theory,Optimization,Reliability,Security | Econometrics,Resource allocation,Engineering,Marketing,Environmental economics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
181 | 2 | 0377-2217 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
33 | 4.34 | 9 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| M. Naceur Azaiez | 1 | 46 | 11.95 |
| Vicki M. Bier | 2 | 421 | 40.44 |