Title
Nonlinear programming and stationary equilibria in stochastic games
Abstract
Stationary equilibria in discounted and limiting average finite state/action space stochastic games are shown to be equivalent to global optima of certain nonlinear programs. For zero sum limiting average games, this formulation reduces to a linear objective, nonlinear constraints program, which finds the “best” stationary strategies, even whene-optimal stationary strategies do not exist, for arbitrarily smalle.
Year
DOI
Venue
1991
10.1007/BF01594936
Math. Program.
Keywords
Field
DocType
stochastic game,stochastic game theory.,nonlinear programming,stationary equilibrium,constraint programming
Mathematical optimization,Nonlinear system,Nonlinear programming,Global optimum,Finite state,Game theory,Nash equilibrium,Limiting,Mathematics,Stochastic game
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
50
2
0025-5610
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
11
2.60
2
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jerzy A. Filar114929.59
T A Schultz2155.34
F. Thuijsman37720.53
O. J. Vrieze44919.22