Paper Info
Title
Spectrum sharing in secondary networks: A bargain theoretic approach.
Abstract
In this paper, we address the problem of dynamic channel access by a set of cognitive radio enabled nodes (e. g., broadcast access points), where each node acting in a selfish manner tries to access and use as many channels as possible, subject to the interference constraints. We model the dynamic channel access problem as a modified Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining game. In our model, each node (player) negotiates with the other nodes to obtain an agreeable sharing rule of the available channels, such that, no two interfering nodes use the same channel. We solve the bargaining game by finding Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) strategies of the game. First, we consider finite horizon version of the bargaining game and investigate its SPNE strategies. We then extend these results to the infinite horizon bargaining game. Furthermore, we identify Pareto optimal equilibria of the game for improving spectrum utilization. The bargaining solution ensures that no node is starved of channels. We also conduct extensive simulations to study how the "self-gain" maximizing strategy of the players impact system wide performance.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1109/WCNC.2012.6213986
WCNC
Keywords
Field
DocType
cognitive radio,game theory,wireless channels,SPNE strategy,bargain theoretic approach,cognitive radio enabled nodes,dynamic channel access problem,infinite horizon bargaining game,interference constraints,modified Rubinstein-Ståhl bargaining game,secondary networks,self-gain maximizing strategy,spectrum sharing,spectrum utilization,subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy
Mathematical optimization,Computer science,Computer network,Subgame perfect equilibrium,Repeated game,Game theory,Normal-form game,Sequential game,Non-cooperative game,Extensive-form game,Bargaining problem
Conference
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
1525-3511
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Swastik Brahma120221.13
Mainak Chatterjee21562175.84