Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Two security domains that want to exchange information securely may need to agree on translations of Mandatory Access Control (MAC) labels of their information, if their MAC labels have a different syntax or semantics. Ir is desirable that these translations do not introduce any confidentiality violations. In this paper we present a property, the Security Level Translation Property (SLTP), which must hold if the security level translation functions satisfy MAC confidentiality. This property is in some sense the best possible non-disclosure test of the level translations in the absence of a "common domain" that gives the real relationships among the levels of the two domains. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
1999 | 10.1109/SECPRI.1999.766914 | PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1999 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
information security,data privacy,national security,authorisation,authorization,testing,syntax,information exchange,information systems,satisfiability,semantics | Security testing,Computer security,Computer science,Asset (computer security),Information security,Security service,Cloud computing security,Mandatory access control,Security information and event management,Computer security model | Conference |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
1081-6011 | 3 | 0.45 |
References | Authors | |
0 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| David Rosenthal | 1 | 3 | 0.45 |
| Francis Fung | 2 | 42 | 6.05 |