Title
Path selection and multipath congestion control
Abstract
In this paper, we investigate the benefits that accrue from the use of multiple paths by a session coupled with rate control over those paths. In particular, we study data transfers under two classes of multipath control, coordinated control where the rates over the paths are determined as a function of all paths, and uncoordinated control where the rates are determined independently over each path. We show that coordinated control exhibits desirable load balancing properties; for a homogeneous static random paths scenario, we show that the worst-case throughput performance of uncoordinated control behaves as if each user has but a single path (scaling like log(log(N) )/ log(N) where N is the system size, measured in number of resources), whereas coordinated control yields a worstcase throughput allocation bounded away from zero. We then allow users to change their set of paths and introduce the notion of a Nash equilibrium. We show that both coordinated and uncoordinated control lead to Nash equilibria corresponding to desirable welfare maximizing states, provided in the latter case, the rate controllers over each path do not exhibit any round-trip time (RTT) bias (unlike TCP Reno). Finally, we show in the case of coordinated control that more paths are better, leading to greater welfare states and throughput capacity, and that simple path reselection polices that shift to paths with higher net benefit can achieve these states.
Year
DOI
Venue
2011
10.1145/1866739.1866762
INFOCOM
Keywords
Field
DocType
data transfer,nash equilibria,round trip time,congestion control,welfare state,nash equilibrium,load balance
Multipath propagation,Mathematical optimization,Path (graph theory),Computer science,Game theory,Network congestion,Throughput,Nash equilibrium,Scaling,Bounded function
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
54
1
0001-0782
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
64
4.64
14
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Peter Key1110884.97
Laurent Massoulié23512244.42
Don Towsley3186931951.05