Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We prove that when the number of (potential) buyers is at least three, every ex post equilibrium in the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves combinatorial auction mechanisms is a bundling equilibrium and is symmetric. This complements a theorem proved by Holzman, Kfir-Dahav, Monderer, and Tennenholtz (2003), according to which, the symmetric bundling equilibria are precisely those defined by a quasi-field. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2004 | 10.1016/j.geb.2003.04.001 | Games and Economic Behavior |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
C72,D44,D78 | Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Economics,Combinatorial auction | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
47 | 1 | 0899-8256 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
13 | 3.50 | 3 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ron Holzman | 1 | 287 | 43.78 |
| Dov Monderer | 2 | 307 | 60.57 |