Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper generalizes the Shapley Value to a non-symmetric value for transferable utility games with two level coalition structure. Non-symmetry exists in players and in both two-level coalition structures. We present seven axioms to characterize this value and provide a property which show that our result consistent with Levy and McLean's weighted coalition structure value and E. Kalai and D. Sament's weighted Shapley value. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2010 | 10.1109/ICEE.2010.839 | ICEE |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
weight,weighted two-level coalition structure,consistency,two-level coalition structure,level coalition structure,game theory,shapley value,transferable utility game,weighted coalition structure value,e. kalai,non-symmetric value,nonsymmetric value,economics,resource management,transferable utility,games,magnetic resonance imaging | Resource management,Economics,Mathematical economics,Shapley value,Axiom,Microeconomics,Game theory,Transferable utility | Conference |
ISBN | Citations | PageRank |
978-0-7695-3997-3 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
1 | 2 | |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jianfeng Chen | 1 | 14 | 3.79 |
| Xingzhou Zhang | 2 | 0 | 2.03 |