Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
There are many situations wherein a group of individuals (e.g., voters, experts, sports writers) must produce an ordered list
of ‘best’ alternatives selected from a given group of alternatives (e.g., candidates, proposals, sports teams). Two long established
mechanisms that have been used for this task are ‘Zermelo’s Ranking Method’ (1929) and ‘Borda’s Voting Scheme’ (1781). The
main purpose of this paper is to point out that they are, under certain common circumstances, identical. We then show that
Zermelo’s Method can be used in situations that Borda’s Method is not designed to handle. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1007/s00355-008-0327-7 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Social Choice Function, Vote Method, Vote Situation, Borda Score, Positive Involvement | Welfare economics,Economics,Mathematical economics,Ranking,Voting | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
32 | 3 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 3 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lowell Bruce Anderson | 1 | 0 | 0.34 |
| Helena Dandurova | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
| James E. Falk | 3 | 297 | 68.47 |
| Lana Yeganova | 4 | 89 | 9.92 |