Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This paper investigates absorption and global accessibility under perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives.
An action distribution in the society is absorbing if there is no equilibrium path escaping from the distribution, and globally accessible if, from every initial distribution, there exists an equilibrium path which converges to the distribution. Using time symmetry
of the dynamics, we show that every absorbing strict Nash equilibrium, if it exists, is globally accessible under zero rate
of time preference. With the additional assumption of supermodularity, we prove that there generically exists an absorbing
strict Nash equilibrium. Relations with a global game and a reaction-diffusion model also become clear. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1007/s00182-007-0101-6 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
perfect foresight dynamics · games with linear incentives · supermodular games · equilibrium selection,nash equilibrium,equilibrium selection,time preference,reaction diffusion,global game,dynamic game | Journal | 37 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 1432-1270 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.37 | 8 | 1 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Satoru Takahashi | 1 | 33 | 4.39 |